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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALDISERT, Circuit Judge. 
 
In the course of proceedings to remove Appellee Hany 
Mahmoud Kiareldeen, an ethnic Palestinian and Israeli 
citizen, from the United States, the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service ("INS") relied on classified evidence 
obtained by the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force. This 
evidence suggested that Appellee was a member of a 
terrorist organization, was involved in the 1993 bombing of 
the World Trade Center and had made threats against 
Attorney General Janet Reno. 
 
After numerous administrative hearings, stays and 
appeals, the district court granted Kiareldeen a writ of 
habeas corpus, reasoning that the INS had not sufficiently 
proved its case against him to justify its actions during 
removal proceedings. The court later awarded him 
$110,743.06 in attorney fees under the Equal Access to 
Justice Act ("EAJA"), determining that the INS's detention, 
and litigation in support of the detention, were not 
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substantially justified. The Attorney General and the INS 
now appeal the grant of attorneys' fees. We reverse the 
judgment. 
 
The EAJA provides that "a court shall award to a 
prevailing party other than the United States fees and other 
expenses . . . unless the court finds that the position of the 
United States was substantially justified or that special 
circumstances make an award unjust." 28 U.S.C. 
SS 2412(d)(1)(A); see also Comm'r, INS v. Jean, 496 U.S. 
154, 159-160 (1990). The government must meet this 
threshold twice. First, it must independently establish that 
the agency action giving rise to the litigation was 
substantially justified. Second, it must establish that its 
litigation positions were substantially justified. See id. See 
also Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA , 703 
F.2d 700, 708 (3d Cir. 1983). The principal argument 
advanced by the government is that its position during 
removal proceedings was substantially justified. We hold 
that it was, and reverse the district court's grant of 
attorneys' fees. 
 
Although the government originally took the position that 
the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear this case, that 
court assumed jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 2241. We 
have jurisdiction to review the government's appeal of the 
district court's final order granting attorneys' fees pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
 
This court reviews a district court's determination of no 
substantial justification in an EAJA suit for abuse of 
discretion. See Morgan v. Perry, 142 F.3d 670, 682-683 (3d 
Cir. 1998) (citing Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 558- 
563 (1988)); cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1070 (1999). This court 
will not interfere with a district court's exercise of discretion 
"unless there is a definite and firm conviction that the court 
. . . committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion 
it reached upon a weighing of the relevant factors." Morgan, 
142 F.3d at 683. 
 
However, we may find an abuse of discretion "when no 
reasonable person would adopt the district court's view" or 
"when the district court's decision rests upon a clearly 
erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law or an 
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improper application of law to fact." Id. at 682-683. This 
court will also "review an award [of attorneys' fees] de novo 
insofar as it rests on conclusions of law, such as an 
interpretation of the statutory terms that define eligibility 
for an award." Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs. v. Dep't of Labor, 159 
F.3d 597, 599 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (citing Love v. Reilly, 924 
F.2d 1492, 1493 (9th Cir. 1991)); see also Friends of 
Boundary Waters Wilderness v. Thomas, 53 F.3d 881, 885 
(8th Cir. 1995) (holding that when the abuse of discretion 
standard is applied in an EAJA case, the district court's 




Kiareldeen entered the United States on a student visa on 
April 27, 1990. He then violated the specific terms of his 
visa by remaining in the United States after completing his 
studies in 1994. On March 26, 1998, the INS served him 
with a Notice to Appear charging that he was removable 
under S 237(a)(1)(C)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality 
Act ("INA") for failing to comply with the terms of his visa. 
The service ordered him held without bond pending the 
outcome of his deportation hearing. 
 
On April 27, 1998, an immigration judge denied bond 
and scheduled a removal hearing. On May 22, 1998, 
Kiareldeen conceded that he violated the terms of his visa, 
and then sought an adjustment of status based upon INA 
S 245 (marriage to a United States citizen). The INS resisted 
the adjustment of status with evidence that Kiareldeen had 
filed a false birth certificate with the immigration judge. The 
INS also submitted classified evidence to the immigration 
judge, in camera and ex parte, alleging that (1) Kiareldeen 
was a member of a foreign terrorist organization, (2) he was 
involved in a meeting planning the 1993 attack on the 
World Trade Center one week prior to the actual attack, at 
which a suicide bombing was discussed, and (3) he later 
threatened to kill Attorney General Janet Reno for her role 
in convicting those responsible for the 1993 bombing of the 
World Trade Center. 
 
The INS provided Kiareldeen with several unclassified 
summaries of the classified evidence of the Federal Bureau 
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of Investigation ("FBI"). The summary dated July 29, 1998, 
stated that the information was obtained by the Joint 
Terrorism Task Force, an FBI-supervised squad with 
detailed representation from numerous law enforcement 
agencies that work together on terrorism matters in the 
Newark, New Jersey area. The summary stated also that 
the information gathered was foreign intelligence 
information based on multiple sources, which the FBI 
considered to be reliable, and that the FBI had taken 
"additional steps to test the veracity of the source reporting 
the threat against the Attorney General." App. Vol. II at 25- 
28. It emphasized that the reliability of the sources "is of 
fundamental concern to the FBI" and that the 
characterization of the reporting "is controlled by guidelines 
set forth in the National Foreign Intelligence Program 
Manual." Id. at 25. Finally, it explained that this type of 
information regarding terrorist investigations is"classified 
to protect against disclosure that would permit a terrorist 
or suspected terrorist organization, group, or individual to 
avoid preventive or detection measures, or would reveal FBI 
or other intelligence agency sources and methods by which 
such information is obtained." Id. at 26. 
 
Kiareldeen responded to the accusations with character 
witness testimony from family and friends, as well as other 
evidence seeking to rebut the claims in the unclassified 
summaries. On April 2, 1999, the immigration judge 
granted his application for adjustment of status, awarded 
conditional permanent resident status and released him on 
bail. That same day, the INS appealed the decision to the 
Board of Immigration Appeals ("Board"), which then issued 
a stay of the release order. 
 
Kiareldeen appealed the temporary stay, but the Board 
denied the motion. It stated that Kiareldeen's "use of a 
fraudulent birth certificate in conjunction with his 
application for adjustment of status . . . [is a] serious 
matter . . . [which] casts doubt on [Kiareldeen's] credibility 
and on the credibility of the evidence he submitted." Id. at 
62. The Board further found that the INS was likely to 
prevail on its appeal, and that "there [are] sufficient 
reason[s] to believe that the respondent would be a threat 
to the national security . . . such that we find the 
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respondent ineligible for bond." Id. Kiareldeen also filed a 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the district court 
challenging the government's use of classified evidence to 
detain him, which was also denied. 
 
On October 15, 1999, a separate panel of the Board 
issued a decision on the merits of the case granting the 
adjustment of status. Because of this, the prior Board 
panel lifted the stay on the release order and bond appeal. 
On October 20, 1999, the district court issued an Opinion 
and Order finding 8 U.S.C. S 1229a(b)(4)(B) 
unconstitutional as applied and ordering Kiareldeen's 
release. See Kiareldeen v. Reno, 71 F. Supp. 2d 402, 414 
(D.N.J. 1999). It held that Kiareldeen's due process rights 
were violated by the government's reliance on classified 
information, which denied him both meaningful notice and 
an opportunity to confront the evidence. Later that day, the 
Board panel considering his bond ordered his release. 
 
The following day, the INS filed a notice of appeal and 
sought an emergency stay from this court. A single judge 
issued a stay of execution pending further action by a 
motions panel. On October 25, 1999, the INS released 
Kiareldeen, withdrew its stay motion and decided not to 
pursue further appeals on the merits of the habeas corpus 
decision. On October 28, 1999, we denied the INS's motion 
to vacate the district court decision. 
 
In addition to ordering Kiareldeen's release, the district 
court also ordered the government to pay attorneys' fees 
and costs. See id. at 419. The court later vacated this part 
of the order, after which Kiareldeen petitioned for fees and 
costs under the EAJA. See generally 28 U.S.C. S 2412. On 
April 11, 2000, the court ordered the government to pay 
Kiareldeen $110,743.06 in attorneys' fees and costs. See 
Kiareldeen v. Reno, 92 F. Supp. 2d 403, 409 (D.N.J. 2000). 
The government now appeals the decision to award fees, 
arguing that the district court abused its discretion in 
determining that there was no substantial justification for 




We vigorously emphasize that the issue before us is solely 
the grant of attorneys' fees and costs. We are not reviewing 
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the merits of the decisions in the administrative 
proceedings or in the district court. It is necessary to make 
this strong statement because the tenor of the briefs 
submitted by the parties seems to concentrate on the 
merits of the decision granting the writ of habeas corpus, 
instead of on the much more limited issue of the attorneys' 
fee award. Our responsibility, therefore, is extremely 
limited. We must review the record and determine whether, 
in opposing Kiareldeen's various contentions in the removal 
and habeas corpus proceedings, "the position of the United 





The government argues first that it was justified in 
seeking Kiareldeen's removal from the United States 
because of the evidence presented by the FBI's Joint 
Terrorism Task Force. This evidence alleged that Kiareldeen 
was a member of a foreign terrorist organization, that he 
was involved in a meeting planning the 1993 bombing of 
the World Trade Center one week prior to the actual attack 
and that he later threatened to kill Attorney General Janet 
Reno for her role in convicting those responsible for the 
bombing. In prosecuting its case, the government relied on 
the alleged statements of Nidal Ayyad and Sheikh Omar 
Abdel Rahman in order to implicate Kiareldeen in the 1993 
bombing. 
 
The major position asserted by Kiareldeen in the habeas 
corpus proceeding was that he had been unlawfully 
detained by the INS on the basis of classified information 
that was not disclosed to him for national security reasons. 
The government contends that it had a duty to oppose 
Kiareldeen's position challenging the constitutionality of 8 
U.S.C. S 1229a(b)(4)(B) as it was applied to him. The statute 
provides in relevant part: 
 
       The alien shall have a reasonable opportunity to 
       examine the evidence against the alien, to present 
       evidence on the alien's own behalf, and to cross- 
       examine witnesses presented by the Government but 
       these rights shall not entitle the alien to examine such 
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       national security information as the Government may 
       proffer in opposition to the alien's admission to the 
       United States or to an application by the alien for 
       discretionary relief under this chapter. 
 




Kiareldeen argues that his detainment was unlawful 
because it was based solely upon classified evidence. He 
argues that he was deprived of the "most basic elements of 
due process--meaningful notice of the evidence used 
against him and an opportunity to confront it." Appellee's 
Brief at 18-19. He also argues that "[t]he lack of substantial 
justification for the government's pre-litigation conduct is 
further buttressed by the exclusively hearsay character of 
the evidence it relied upon to detain Kiareldeen." Id. at 24. 
Kiareldeen further argues that he was not challenging the 
constitutionality of a statute, but simply the 
constitutionality of applying 8 U.S.C. S 1229a(b)(4)(B) to his 
particular case. 
 
We are persuaded that Appellee's contentions, whatever 
force they may have had in influencing the ultimate 
administrative decisions and the district court judgment, 
are insufficient to demonstrate that the government's 
position either before or during litigation proceedings were 




As the government's arguments are fact specific, we find 




Kiareldeen vigorously argues that his detention, based 
primarily upon classified evidence, denied him the due 
process rights of meaningful notice and opportunity to 
respond. However, the favorable outcomes in both the 
administrative and district court proceedings severely dilute 
the efficacy of this contention. Kiareldeen was provided with 
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several unclassified summaries of the information the INS 
had submitted to the immigration judge. Though these 
summaries were not highly fact-specific, ensuring that 
neither the FBI's sources nor national security were 
compromised, they did provide him with the "who," "what," 
"when" and "where" of the allegations against him. Armed 
with this information, he then presented a considerable 
amount of live testimony and documentary evidence to the 
accusations. 
 
These unclassified summaries were apparently 
informative enough that he was even able to surmise the 
identity of one of the FBI's informants--his ex-wife, an 
individual who was "a potentially crucial source of 
government information." Kiareldeen v. Reno , 92 F. Supp. 
2d. at 408. She had previously levied allegations of 
domestic violence, child abuse and terrorism against him. 
Because she now refused to answer Kiareldeen's questions 
in court, ostensibly out of fear for her own safety, the court 
offered him the opportunity to submit written 
interrogatories to her. Kiareldeen chose not to do so. 
 
Although Kiareldeen argues that the information provided 
him was not detailed enough to adequately respond, the 
result obtained from the hearings belies that claim. In the 
end, he mounted a successful defense to the government's 
case, winning his case at both the administrative and 
district court levels. He was released from detention, and 
then was granted an adjustment of status. In light of this 
favorable outcome, it seems rather disingenuous to now 
assert that the classified summaries the government 





Kiareldeen argues that the government denied him due 
process because it relied on hearsay evidence without first 
establishing that the original declarants were unavailable 
for testimony. Putting aside what seems to be obvious--it is 
difficult to claim a deprivation of due process of law when 
one has been totally victorious in the various administrative 
and judicial proceedings--the simple response to this 
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contention is that hearsay evidence is, in fact, admissible in 
removal proceedings. Though the hearsay nature of 
evidence certainly affects the weight it is accorded, it does 
not prevent its admissibility in immigration cases. See 
Cunanan v. INS, 856 F.2d 1373, 1374 (9th Cir. 1988); 
Martin-Mendoza v. INS, 499 F.2d 918, 921 (9th Cir. 1974); 
Matter of Grijalva, 19 I. & N. 713, 721-722 (BIA 1988). In 
INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984), the Court 
recognized that a hearsay document (INS Form I-213) 
typically constitutes the exclusive basis for a decision made 




Although Kiareldeen now insists that his case did not 
challenge the constitutionality of any statute, his habeas 
petition made the following assertions: (1) his detainment 
without bond, which was based on classified evidence, was 
not authorized by the INA; (2) his detention violated the 
Due Process Clause of the Constitution because it was 
based on classified evidence, and thus "deprived him of 
adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to defend 
himself "; and (3) his detention violated the Fifth 
Amendment to the Constitution because the INS failed to 
produce a witness. We agree with the government that in 
this light, Kiareldeen's allegations that he did not"challenge 
the facial constitutionality of any statute" are somewhat 
specious. Appellee's Brief at 26. 
 
Section 1229a(b)(4)(B) specifically denies an alien the 
opportunity "to examine such national security information 
as the Government may proffer in opposition to the alien's 
admission to the United States or to an application by the 
alien for discretionary relief . . ." Although bond and 
deportation proceedings are adjudicated separately, 
pursuant to 8 C.F.R. S 3.19(d), "[d]etention is necessarily a 
part of [the] deportation procedure." Carlson v. Landon, 342 
U.S. 524, 538 (1952). Because Kiareldeen's brief challenges 
the general use of classified information, his assertions 
necessarily challenge the constitutionality of the federal 
statute. We conclude that the Justice Department is duty- 
bound to defend what Congress has enacted, and was 
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therefore substantially justified in defending the 




We turn now to the government's argument that because 
the "position of the United States was substantially 
justified," the award of attorneys' fees should be reversed. 




The government argues that, as a general rule, defense of 
a congressional statute "will usually be substantially 
justified." League of Women Voters of California v. F.C.C., 
798 F.2d 1255, 1259 (9th Cir. 1986); see also Grace v. 
Burger, 763 F.2d 457, 458 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (explaining 
that Congress has a duty to self-police its measures for 
compatibility with the Constitution, and thus situations in 
which its defense of a statute is not substantially justified 
should be exceptional). 
 
This general rule is a product of two constitutional 
norms: (1) the Executive Branch has an obligation to"take 
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed," U.S. Const., art. 
II, S 3, and (2) those laws enjoy a presumption of 
constitutionality in court. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 
57, 64 (1981). In enacting the EAJA, it is implausible that 
Congress intended to penalize the government for defending 
the constitutionality of its own enactments through the 
imposition of attorney fee liability. 
 
The government argues that it has a duty to defend the 
constitutionality of statutes, including amendments to the 
INA, which Congress enacted in 1996. The INA governs the 
procedure used by the INS in removal proceedings. It 
declares that an alien's statutory right to examine the 
evidence against him in a removal proceeding does not 
entitle him "to examine such national security information 
as the Government may proffer in opposition to the alien's 
admission to the United States or to an application by the 
alien for discretionary relief under [the Act]." 8 U.S.C. 
S 1229a(b)(4)(B). This particular provision of the INA 
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codified two previous cases which upheld the use of 
classified evidence to both oppose admissions and deny 
discretionary relief applications. See Shaughnessy v. United 
States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953) (holding that the 
Attorney General cannot be compelled to disclose evidence 
used to exclude an alien); United States ex rel. Knauff v. 
Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950) (upholding a regulation 
providing for summary exclusion without a hearing for an 
alien deemed to be a security risk). 
 
Kiareldeen responds to the government's argument by 
challenging the constitutionality of the use of classified 
evidence generally. He emphasizes that "[n]o court that has 
subjected the INS's use of secret evidence to the modern 
due process analysis set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 
U.S. 319 (1976), has found its constitutionality even to be 
a close question." Appellee's Brief at 15. He relies on two 
decisions for the proposition that the INS's use of classified 
evidence is unconstitutional per se. See Rafeedie v. INS, 
880 F.2d 506 (D.C. Cir. 1989); American-Arab Anti- 
Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 1995) 
("AADC").1 He emphasizes also that in both of these cases 
the INS abandoned appeals available to it, and was later 
ordered to pay attorneys' fees under the EAJA. 
 
Although this addresses the merits of the district court's 
decision, it is simply beside the point. The propriety vel non 
of the district court's treatment of this constitutional 
argument is not before us, nor is it relevant to the appeal 
at hand. Because the appeal from the habeas corpus 
decision was withdrawn, that issue is still an open question 
in this court. What is relevant, however, is whether the 
government was substantially justified in defending the 
constitutionality of the statute Kiareldeen attacks. We hold 




The INS provided Kiareldeen with several unclassified 
summaries of the classified evidence. The summary 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Since vacated by the Court in Reno v. American-Arab Anti- 
Discrimination Committee, 524 U.S. 471 (1999). 
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provided on July 29, 1998 stated that it was comprised of 
information obtained by the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task 
Force. It explained that this information concerning 
terrorist investigations is "classified to protect against 
disclosure that would permit a terrorist or suspected 
terrorist organization, group, or individual to avoid 
preventive or detection measures, or would reveal FBI or 
other intelligence agency sources and methods by which 
such information is obtained." App. Vol. II at 26.2 Indeed, 
with each subsequent summary the government provided 
Kiareldeen, it appears to have been making a concerted 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The July 29, 1998 communication which the FBI provided Kiareldeen 
stated the following: 
 
The information in this communication was obtained from multiple 
reliable sources who have provided reliable information in the past. 
 
The Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) is an FBI supervised squad with 
detailed representation from numerous law enforcement agencies that 
work jointly on terrorism matters in the Newark, New Jersey area. 
 
This document contains information obtained by the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation pursuant to its investigatory powers as governed by the 
Attorney General Guidelines for FBI Foreign Intelligence Collection and 
Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations, dated June 8, 1995. These 
guidelines are established by the Attorney General to govern all 
investigations of international terrorism conducted by the FBI pursuant 
to Executive Order 12333. 
 
The majority of information collected pursuant to these guidelines is 
foreign intelligence information and is classified national security 
information as defined by Executive Order 12958. Certain information 
which would otherwise be unclassified when standing alone, such as the 
fact that an organization has been designated by the United States 
Secretary of State as a terrorist organization, may require classification 
when combined with or associated with other unclassified or classified 
information. Additionally, when presented in a context that would reveal 
the FBI's investigative interest in certain individuals, organizations, or 
countries, information which would normally be unclassified may be 
properly classified. 
 
Reliability of source information is of fundamental concern to the FBI 
as it becomes the intelligence base of FBI investigations. 
Characterization of FBI asset reporting is controlled by guidelines set 
forth in the National Foreign Intelligence Program Manual. 
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effort to divulge as much information as possible to assist 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
"National security" as defined in Executive Order 12958, section 1.1(a), 
refers to the national defense or foreign relations of the United States. 
Investigation of international terrorism is necessary to the national 
security. Counter terrorism investigations are primarily intended to 
prevent harm to U.S. persons and U.S. interests, but also are designed 
to prevent harm generally. In conducting counter terrorism 
investigations, the FBI seeks information dealing with, but not limited 
to: 
(1) individuals, groups, or organizations who are or may be engaged in 
terrorist activities; (2) recruitment of targets by individuals or 
organizations who are or may be engaged in terrorist activities; (3) the 
organizational structure of terrorist and suspected terrorist 
organizations 
or groups of individuals; (4) methods of procurement and training 
employed by terrorist and suspected terrorist organizations or groups 
and individuals; (5) operational and financial plans and techniques of 
terrorist and suspected terrorist organizations or groups and individuals, 
including fund-raising; (6) methods of communication by terrorist and 
suspected terrorist organizations or groups and individuals; and (7) 
information needed to protect the safety of any persons or organizations, 
including those who are targets, victims or hostages of international 
terrorist organizations. Collection of this and similar information is 
essential to the FBI's ability to identify and counteract threats to the 
national security. Non-public information collected pursuant to 
international terrorism investigations is classified to protect against 
disclosure that would permit a terrorist or suspected terrorist 
organization, group, or individual to avoid preventive or detection 
measures, or would reveal FBI or other intelligence agency sources and 
methods by which such information is obtained. 
 
HANY KIARELDEEN is a native of Israel who was born in Zaytoun, in 
the Gaza Strip on January 30, 1968. 
 
The JTTF of the FBI Newark Division developed information that Hany 
Kiareldeen is a suspected member of a terrorist organization. Information 
has disclosed Kiareldeen maintains relationships with other members 
and/or suspected members of terrorist organizations dedicated to 
committing acts of violence against the people of the United States or its 
allies. 
 
A source advised that approximately one week before the bombing of 
the World Trade Center (WTC) in New York, Kiareldeen was present at a 
meeting with several individuals who were talking about plans to bomb 
the WTC. The meeting took place at Kiareldeen's residence in Nutley, 
New Jersey. According to a source, Nidal Ayyad (Ayyad) was present at 
this meeting (Ayyad is a convicted co-conspirator in the WTC bombing). 
Ayyad did most of the talking about bombing the WTC as the others 
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him in his defense, without disclosing information in a way 
that could potentially compromise national security. 
 
Information contained in the unclassified summaries was 
ultimately sufficient to assist Kiareldeen in mounting a 
defense to the allegations. However, the same information 
proved insufficient to both the immigration judge and the 
district court. Although accepting the JTTF summaries as 
"expert evidence," the immigration judge determined that 
the INS's lack of testimony, both public and in camera, was 
insufficient to counter Kiareldeen's evidence. App. Vol. II at 
43. The district court, however, attacked the credibility of 
the summaries directly, describing them as "lacking in 
either detail or attribution to reliable sources." Kiareldeen v. 
Reno, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 414. That the FBI would be 
unwilling to compromise national security by revealing its 
undercover sources, is both understandable and 
comforting. That a court would then choose to criticize the 
FBI for being unwilling to risk undermining its covert 
operations against terrorists is somewhat unnerving. 
 
The district court also criticized the government for its 
apparent unwillingness to also bring criminal charges 
against Kiareldeen.3 It stated that "even the government 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
listened. Ayyad stated that he suggested to Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman 
(Rahman) that a suicide bombing should be attempted on the WTC. 
According to Ayyad, Rahman had another idea about bombing the WTC 
and stated that a suicide bombing was not appropriate. 
 
Recently, a source advised [sic] Kiareldeen expressed a desire to 
murder Attorney general Janet Reno for her role in the conviction of 
those responsible for the bombing of the World Trade Center. The 
information developed indicates that Kiareldeen poses a credible threat 
[sic] Attorney General Reno and potentially others within the United 
States. A source advised [sic] Kiareldeen stated in the present of others 
that they, including himself, must kill Janet Reno. Furthermore, 
Kiareldeen stated that an additional person would assist in the murder 
of the Attorney General. The FBI took additional steps to test the 
veracity 
of the source reporting the threat against the Attorney general. 
 
App.Vol. II at 25-27. 
 
3. The district court makes the following categorical statements: "[T]he 
government's reliance on secret evidence violates the due process 
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does not find its own allegations sufficiently serious to 
commence criminal proceedings." Id. 
 
This statement illustrates both a simplistic and entirely 
uninformed view of the processes by which the Justice 
Department investigates and deals with suspected terrorists 
within our borders. It completely disregards the often 
complex determinations involved in releasing confidential 
counter-terrorism intelligence into the public arena through 
its introduction into both administrative hearings and court 
proceedings. Such a criticism implies that the government 
may only utilize information against an individual in a civil 
context, such as in deportation procedures, if it also 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
protection that the Constitution directs must be extended to all persons 
within the United States, citizens and resident aliens alike." Kiareldeen, 
71 F. Supp. 2d. at 414; and the Due Process Clause requires searching 
scrutiny of "government actions taken against resident aliens such as 
Kiareldeen." Id. at 409. Through the period of his detention, Kiareldeen 
never possessed resident alien status. Rather, he was a deportable alien 
who was in this country illegally, having overstayed his student visa. 
This is a distinction with a difference. 
 
       "For reasons long recognized as valid, the responsibility for 
       regulating the relationship between the United States and our alien 
       visitors has been committed to the political branches of the 
Federal 
       Government." Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976). " `[O]ver no 
       conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more 
       complete.' " Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (quoting 
Oceanic 
       Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909)). Thus, 
       "in the exercise of its broad power over immigration and 
       naturalization, `Congress regularly makes rules that would be 
       unacceptable if applied to citizens.' " 430 U.S., at 792 (quoting 
       Mathews v. Diaz, supra, at 79-80). Respondents do not dispute that 
       Congress has the authority to detain aliens suspected of entering 
       the country illegally pending their deportation hearings, see 
Carlson 
       v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 538 (1952); Wong Wing v. United States, 
       163 U.S., at 235. And in enacting the precursor to 8 U.S.C. 
       S1252(a), Congress eliminated any presumption of release pending 
       deportation, committing that determination to the discretion of the 
       Attorney General. See Carlson v. Landon, supra, at 538-540. Of 
       course, the INS regulation must still meet the (unexacting) 
standard 
       of rationally advancing some legitimate governmental purpose . . ." 
 
Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 305-306 (1993). 
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intends to commence criminal proceedings against that 
same individual. Such a fettering of the Executive Branch 
has no support in either case law or statute. 
 
In determining when the government's position in 
immigration matters is substantially justified, especially 
when dealing with potential terrorists, it is improper to 
evaluate its position by using traditional standards of proof 
used in both administrative and court proceedings."The 
function of a standard of proof, as that concept is embodied 
in the Due Process Clause and in the realm of fact finding, 
is to `instruct the fact finder concerning the degree of 
confidence our society thinks he should have in the 
correctness of the factual conclusions for a particular type 
of adjudication.' " Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 
(1979) (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970)). 
 
Thus, at one end of the spectrum is the familiar burden 
of proof in most civil proceedings: preponderance of the 
evidence. At the other end is the standard of proof designed 
to exclude, as nearly as possible, the likelihood of an 
erroneous judgment in a criminal case: proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt. The intermediate standard, generally 
utilized in fraud or quasi-criminal matters, requires a 
higher standard of proof than mere preponderance of the 
evidence. This is the standard that the government must 
utilize in removal proceedings. See Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 
276, 286 (1966) ("We hold that no deportation order may be 
entered unless it is found by clear, unequivocal, and 
convincing evidence that the facts alleged as grounds of 
deportation are true"). See also Ribeiro v. INS, 531 F.2d 179 
(3d Cir. 1976). In ascending order, quantifying the amount 
of evidence required in various proceedings, these burdens 
of proof may also be expressed as degrees of belief. As one 
commentator has suggested, "the only sound and 
defensible hypotheses are that the trier, or triers, of facts 
can find what (a) probably has happened, or (b) what highly 




4. J.P. McBaine, Burden of Proof: Degrees of Belief, 32 Cal. L. Rev. 242, 
245-247 (1944). 
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We are impelled to emphasize, yet again, that in 
considering the question of attorneys' fees, we do not 
determine whether the government was substantially 
justified based upon the result reached in the district court 
proceeding, or upon an inquiry into whether the 
government met its stated burden of proof. Substantial 
justification is measured on the basis of whether the 
government was justified in initiating the proceeding and 
going forward with the hearing before the immigration 
judge. To be substantially justified, the government's 
position need not be "correct", or even "justified to a high 
degree." Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565, 566 n.2 
(1988). Rather, the government must simply have a 
"reasonable basis in both law and fact" or be"justified in 
substance or in the main -- that is, justified to a degree 
that could satisfy a reasonable person." Id.  (internal 
quotation marks omitted).5 Whether the government was 
substantially justified, therefore, does not present the same 
question as that presented by the underlying merits of the 
case. The relevant legal question is "not what the law now 
is, but what the Government was substantially justified in 
believing it to have been." Id. at 561. 
 
A court must not "assume that the government's position 
was not substantially justified simply because the 
government lost on the merits." Morgan v. Perry, 142 F.3d 
670, 685 (3d Cir. 1998) (citation omitted); accord Pierce, 
487 U.S. at 569 (reminding that the government "could 
take a position that is substantially justified, yet lose"); see 
also S. Rep. No. 96-253, at 7 (1979); H.R. Rep. No. 96- 
1418, at 11 (1979), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4984, 
4990 (stating that the EAJA "should not be read to raise a 
presumption that the Government position was not 
substantially justified, simply because it lost the case. Nor, 
in fact, does the standard require the Government to 
establish that its decision to litigate was based on a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. This court usually expresses this formulation in this manner: To 
establish reasonable justification, the government must show "(1) a 
reasonable basis in truth for the facts alleged; (2) a reasonable basis in 
law for the theory it propounded; and (3) a reasonable connection 
between the facts alleged and the legal theory advanced." See, e.g., 
Morgan v. Perry, 142 F.3d 670, 684 (3d Cir. 1998). 
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substantial probability of prevailing"); Clarke v. INS, 904 
F.2d. 172, 175 (3d Cir. 1990) ("EAJA is a waiver of 
sovereign immunity, however, so it must be construed 
strictly in favor of the United States"). 
 
To hold otherwise would force lower level supervisors in 
anti-terrorist investigations to utilize a cost/benefit analysis 
in deciding which cases to pursue. Rather than simply 
pursuing individuals and groups against which the 
government had the strongest case, they might be reluctant 
to pursue any case in which a sizeable fiscal loss could 
result. This would act as a disincentive to faithfully execute 
all the laws, and could result in the government pursuing 
only those individuals and groups against whom it 
appeared to have an almost guaranteed chance of success. 
Looming large would always be the possibility that, in the 
event of a mishap by the government's attorney, the 
government could not only lose its case, it could also lose 
substantial taxpayer funds as well. Finally, the floodgates of 
EAJA cases would be opened, subjecting the government to 
a case similar to this one every time it was unsuccessful. 
This was certainly not Congress's intent in passing the 
EAJA, and thus the government's loss does not, ipso facto, 
manifest a lack of substantial justification. 
 
On the basis of the declassified summary the government 
furnished to Kiareldeen, we are satisfied that there was 
ample substantial justification for the position adopted by 
the government in the habeas corpus proceeding. This is 
especially true considering the FBI's statement that: 
"Investigation of international terrorism is necessary to the 
national security. Counter terrorism investigations are 
primarily intended to prevent harm to U.S. persons and 
U.S. interests, but also are designed to prevent harm 
generally." App. Vol. II at 25-26. 
 
Certainly, in investigating suspected terrorists in 
immigration matters, the government should not be held to 
a higher standard than required by Rule Three and Rule 
Four of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. These 
rules state that an arrest warrant shall be issued only upon 
a written and sworn complaint (1) setting forth"the 
essential facts constituting the offense charged," and (2) 
showing "that there is probable cause to believe that [such] 
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an offense has been committed and that the defendant has 
committed it." Fed. R. Crim. P. 3, 4. Additionally, the 
Fourth Amendment states that ". . . no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. 
Const. amend. IV. This amendment applies to arrest 
warrants as well as search warrants. Giordenello v. United 




Moreover, we should be mindful of the public policy 
statements reflected by Congress in the 1996 amendment 
to the INA. Section 240 of the INA states that an alien is 
not entitled "to examine such national security information 
as the Government may proffer in opposition to the alien's 
admission to the United States or to an application by the 
alien for discretionary relief under [the Act]." 8 U.S.C. 
S 1229a(b)(4)(B). Additionally, on October 26, 2001, 
President Bush signed the USA Patriot Act of 2001, which 
was approved by Congress just days before its signing. This 
Act expanded the investigative powers of our law 
enforcement agencies. It states that it is designed"to deter 
and punish terroristic acts in the United States and around 
the world, to enhance law enforcement investigatory tools, 




We are not inclined to impede investigators in their 
efforts to cast out, root and branch, all vestiges of terrorism 




6. It bears note that H.R. 1266, entitled the"Secret Evidence Repeal Act 
of 2001," was introduced on March 28, 2001, by Representative David 
Bonier (D-MI) and was later referred to the Subcommittee on 
Immigration and Claims of the House Judiciary Committee. This Act, 
whose objective is to limit the government's use of classified evidence in 
cases such as Kiareldeen's, nevertheless would still permit such evidence 
to be used, inter alia, for "terroristic activity deportation." See 8 
U.S.C. 
S1229a(b)(4)(B). See H.R. 1266, 107th Cong. (2001). 
 
                                21 
 
 
       Few interests can be more compelling than a nation's 
       need to ensure its own security. It is well to remember 
       that freedom as we know it has been suppressed in 
       many countries. Unless a society has the capability 
       and will to defend itself from the aggressions of others, 
       constitutional protections of any sort have little 
       meaning. 
 
Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 611-612 (1985). The 
district court, in its fact finding process, understandably 
felt shackled by the government's unwillingness to provide 
Kiareldeen the names and addresses of its counter- 
terrorism personnel, both in uniform and in civilian clothes. 
Nonetheless, the public fisc should not lightly be exposed to 
financial penalties when the war on terrorism is transferred 
from the domestic battlefield that our country has become, 
to the vacuum-sealed environment of a federal courtroom, 
with such civilized accouterments as burdens of proof and 
axioms of evidence. 
 
We conclude also that the government clearly met the 
test of being "substantially justified" by drawing an analogy 
to the concept of probable cause. Inside the courtroom, the 
profound bundle of constitutional rights remains to protect 
the petitioners. And in immigration matters, the 
government may not always be able to prove its case by 
clear, convincing and unequivocal evidence, but this should 
never deter its assiduous search to weed out from our 
midst those who would destroy us. The Court has 
instructed that 
 
       probable cause requires only a probability or 
       substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual 
       showing of such activity. . . In making a determination 
       of probable cause the relevant inquiry is not whether 
       particular conduct is "innocent" or "guilty," but the 
       degree of suspicion that attaches to particular types of 
       noncriminal acts. 
 
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 243-244 n.13 (1983). 
 
The eerie, if not prescient, information that the Joint 
Terrorism Task Force assembled from its sources, must be 
evaluated in light of "the degree of suspicion that attaches 
to particular types of [activities]." Id. In light of the 
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pummeling that the FBI received following the September 
11th tragedy for not possessing sufficient intelligence 
materials, consider the following information revealed by its 
sources in 1998, dealing with a meeting at which 
Kiareldeen was allegedly present: 
 
       A source advised that approximately one week before 
       the bombing of the World Trade Center (WTC) in New 
       York, Kiareldeen was present at a meeting with several 
       individuals who were talking about plans to bomb the 
       WTC. The meeting took place at Kiareldeen's residence 
       in Nutley, New Jersey. According to a source, Nidal 
       Ayyad (Ayyad) was present at this meeting (Ayyad is a 
       convicted co-conspirator in the WTC bombing). Ayyad 
       did most of the talking about bombing the WTC as the 
       others listened. Ayyad stated that he suggested to 
       Sheikh Omsar Abdel Rahman (Rahman) that a suicide 
       bombing should be attempted on the WTC. According 
       to Ayyad, Rahman had another idea about bombing the 
       WTC and stated that a suicide bombing was not 
       appropriate. 
 
App. Vol. II at 26. 
 
On July 29, 1998, the Joint Terrorism Task Force had 
information that Ayyad, the convicted terrorist in the 1993 
bombing of the World Trade Center, suggested a suicide 
bombing of the Center. This understandably created 
apprehension on the part of the Joint Terrorism Task 
Force, alerting the government to take all necessary action 
to investigate all leads and assure the defense of our 
nation. On September 11, 2001, slightly over two years 
after the government supplied this information to both the 
INS and the district court in this case, the convicted 
terrorist's suggestion became a reality. It is impossible to 
conjure up a "particular type[ ]" of activity, as mentioned in 
Gates, that would be more nefarious than that which 
happened on Black Tuesday. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 243 
n.13. Such activity surely constitutes a quantum of 
suspicion justifying probable cause, as well as substantial 
justification for the government's conduct in this case. 
 
For all these reasons, therefore, we find "that the position 
of the United States was substantially justified or that 
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special circumstances make an award unjust," 28 U.S.C. 
S 2412(d)(1)(A), and therefore the district court erred in 
requiring it to pay Kiareldeen attorneys' fees. 
 
* * * * 
 
We have considered all contentions raised by the parties 
and conclude that no further discussion is necessary. 
 
The judgment of the district court awarding attorneys' 
fees will be reversed. 
 
A True Copy: 
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       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
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